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Abstract 
Liberal-democratic states’ commitments to equality and personal autonomy have always proven 
problematic with respect to state regulation of relations between parents and children. In the parental 
authority literature positions have varied from invoking children’s interests to argue for limitations on 
parental efforts to instill identities and values to invoking parental rights to justify state privileging of 
such efforts. 
This article argues that liberal-democratic states should privilege parental efforts to raise their 
children to share their identities and values. Its approach is distinctive in two ways: i) it engages in 
interdisciplinary reflection upon selected findings in psychological literature on immigrant youth, 
acculturation, and identity development to assess philosophical arguments about parental authority; 
and ii) it argues that children’s, and not parental, interests should be viewed as the primary basis for 
parental rights to instill identities and values. Ultimately, the article argues, parental authority to instill 
identities and values is justified by children’s interests in psychological wellbeing and personal 
autonomy. 
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Liberal-democratic states value individual equality and personal autonomy. Commitment to these values 
has always proven problematic in the case of state regulation of parent-children relations because 
children begin life, and remain for many years, clearly unequal to their parents in terms of their capacity 
for personal autonomy. Some authors have argued that concern for children’s capacity for personal 
autonomy and respect for their equality require that strict limits be placed upon parents’ efforts to 
instill identities and values in their children. Others have argued that the state should privilege such 
efforts. For instance, Ferdinand Schoeman advocates that the state recognize, subject to regulation to 
prevent abuse, two types of parental rights ‘against society at large’: privacy rights to shield the family 
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from outside scrutiny and control rights to empower parents to regulate their children’s behaviour and 
the influences to which they are exposed (1980: 10). 
This article contends that liberal-democratic states should privilege parental efforts to instill 
their identities and values in their children. The distinctiveness of its contribution to this literature has 
two bases. First, and most original, it makes its case by engaging in interdisciplinary reflection upon 
selected findings in psychological literatures on immigrant youth, acculturation, and identity 
development. Second, and less unique, it claims that children’s interests, not parental interests, should 
be viewed as the primary basis for parental rights to make such efforts. 
The phrase ‘parental efforts to instill values and identities’ is used advisedly. Parents face many 
obstacles to identity and value transmission, such that it is only reasonable to speak of supporting 
‘efforts,’ not outcomes. In addition to the many counterinfluences children experience outside the 
home, the psychological literature suggests that parental efforts are challenged by the fact that the 
parent-child relationship in the socialization process is reciprocal, not unidirectional (Benish-Weisman et 
al., 2013; Kuczynski and Navarra, 2006; Padilla-Walker and Thompson, 2005). 
This article advances its case by focusing upon two important critiques that have been made of 
parental efforts to instill identities and values. One critique suggests that parental efforts represent a 
conflict between parents’ and children’s interests. The other suggests that such parental efforts may 
threaten children’s capacity for autonomy by preventing them from developing identities and values 
that are properly their own. Psychological literature on immigrant youth, acculturation, and identity 
development facilitates reflection upon some of the key assumptions that underlie these critiques, 
particularly those concerning the likely effects of parent-child identity and value congruence on 
children’s wellbeing and the ability of parents to influence, and to refrain from influencing, children’s 
identity and value development. This article finds both critiques wanting and argues that children’s 
wellbeing and autonomy interests, when understood through reflection on the psychological literature, 
can be advanced by privileging parental efforts to instill identities and values. 
The psychological literatures on adolescence, socialization, identity development, and parenting 
and autonomy are vast (Guenther and Alicke, 2015; Laird, 2015). This article focuses on research within 
these domains that addresses acculturation and immigrant youth. In this literature, acculturation refers 
to ‘the process of cultural and psychological change that follows intercultural contact’ (Berry et al., 2006: 
305); ‘youth’ are typically, but not universally, defined as those aged 13-24; and, depending upon the 
study, ‘immigrant youth’ includes first-, second-, and, less so, third-generation immigrants. Youth are an 
appropriate focus for this study for two reasons: i) key processes that are directly relevant to this article, 
identity and autonomy development, take place during adolescence (Laird, 2015); and ii) adolescence 
represents a key point at which to assess the impacts of parental efforts to instill identities and values 
that begin in childhood, on their children’s wellbeing. While the studies that compose this literature do 
not work with a uniform conception of identities and values, the ‘cultural dimensions’ they tend to 
address (e.g., ‘language, religion, values, status and ‘race’’ (Berry, 2006: 131-132)) are typical of the 
kinds of identities and values that parents seek to instill and that significantly influence children’s ability 
to exercise autonomy as they mature. 
Having become familiar with this literature in another context (Wilson-Forsberg and Robinson, 
forthcoming), I recognized its potential to inform interdisciplinary contributions to the parental 
authority literature. While the psychological literature drawn upon in this article focuses on immigrant 
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youth, the implications are much broader. As Padilla-Walker and Thompson (2005) have noted ‘research 
on immigrant and ethnic families for whom the question of conflict between family values and values 
from other sources is particularly salient’ (306) is relevant for considering the situation of ‘typical 
middle-class families of the dominant culture in the United States who do not face the same kinds of 
acculturation and discrimination pressures…but who still face situations in which children encounter 
values outside the home that conflict with the parents’ own values’ (308). 
The next section sets the context for the discussion that follows by locating the two critiques of 
parental efforts to instill identities and values within the broader philosophical literature on parental 
authority. 
Liberal-democratic theories of parental authority 
In arguing in favour of state privileging of parental efforts to instill identities and values in their children, 
I accept and propose to work within key points of agreement in the literature on parental authority in 
the liberal-democratic states. 
These points of agreement can be usefully discussed by reflecting upon what Brighouse and 
Swift (2014) call the ‘liberal challenge.’ It 
concerns the distribution of freedom and authority between parents, children, and the state. 
Liberals think it valuable that individuals be free to make and act on their own judgments about 
how they are to live their lives; justifying authority requires an account of how anybody can 
have the right to decide for others (2). 
The first sentence emphasizes the key interest-bearers in discussions of parental authority: parents, 
children, and the state. The reference to the need for justification of authority in the last sentence 
accentuates the liberal commitment to treat all humans as possessing equal moral worth: this places the 
onus of justification on those who would impose limitations. This literature relies primarily on the 
language of rights to justify and limit authority. And, whether implicitly or explicitly, most participants 
work with something akin to Joseph Raz’s interest-based conception of rights according to which ‘‘X has 
a right’ if and only if X can have rights, and, other things being equal, an aspect of X’s well-being (his 
interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a duty’ (1986: 166). Given 
the commitment to equality, the determination of such rights requires that the interests of both rights-
claimants and proposed duty-bearers receive consideration. Finally, the importance of personal 
autonomy is reflected in the endorsement of the freedom of individuals ‘to make and act on their own 
judgments about how they are to live their lives’. 
It is within these points of general agreement that critiques of parental efforts to instill identities 
and values have arisen. Two such critiques are examined in light of psychological literature in the two 
sections that follow. The first presents parental efforts to instill identities and values as constituting a 
conflict between parents’ and children’s interests. The second suggests that such parental efforts can 
undermine children’s capacity for personal autonomy. After suggesting problems with these critiques, 
the final section describes ‘situated autonomy,’ which, it is argued, is consistent with psychological 
accounts of identity development and can justify state privileging of parental efforts to instill values. 
Are parental efforts to instill identities and values primarily a matter of parents’, and not children’s, 
interests? 
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One critique of parental efforts to instill identities and values has emerged in a line of argument 
between advocates of ‘dual interest’ and ‘child-centred’ approaches to defining parental authority 
(Hannan and Vernon, 2008). Those who adopt ‘dual interest’ approaches suggest that parental authority 
is justified by a combination of parents’ and children’s interests, while those who adopt ‘child-centred’ 
approaches suggest that only children’s interests should count. What is interesting from our perspective 
is that, despite the definitions, both advocates of dual interest approaches and their critics treat 
parental efforts to instill identities and values as primarily a matter of parents’ interests that can 
potentially conflict with children’s rights. This characterization obscures the possibility that children 
might also have vital interests in these processes. As we shall see, reflection upon the psychological 
literature suggests that children do have vital interests in terms of wellbeing and, thus, children’s 
interest should play a greater role in these discussions. 
While proponents of the dual interest approach suggest that parental efforts to instill identities 
and values promote both parental and children’s interests, their arguments suggest that the primary 
justification rests with parental interests. Consider two of the most prominent advocates, Ferdinand 
Schoeman (1980) and William Galston (2002) (other examples include Macleod, 2015; Noggle, 2002; 
Reshef, 2013). While both argue that the sharing of identities and values between parents and children 
benefits children, they put special emphasis on the contribution to parents’ interests. Schoeman says 
parent-child intimacy ‘tends to be the primary reason adults in our culture give for wanting and having 
children’ (1980: 9); Galston famously argues that parental authority should recognize that ‘the ability to 
raise their children in a manner consistent with their deepest commitments is an essential element of 
[parents’] expressive liberty’ (2002: 102). Dual interest advocates are also insistent that these parental 
interests are distinct from, and thus, I would add, susceptible to come into conflict with, children’s 
interests: Galston writes that ‘the expressive interests of the parents are not reducible to their fiduciary 
duty to promote their children’s interests’ (2002: 103) and Schoeman says that the danger of rights talk 
is that it ‘unambiguously suggests that the [parent-child] relationship is a one-way relationship aimed 
almost solely at promoting the best interest of the child’ (1980: 9). Thus, in these accounts, children’s 
interests in parental efforts to instill identities and values appear to play a secondary role and may even 
be overridden by parental interests if the two come into conflict. 
The idea that parental interests play a primary and potentially conflictual role in dual interest 
approaches is also shared by their child-centred critics. For instance, reflecting concerns about the 
equality and separateness of persons, Hannan and Vernon (2008) have criticized Schoeman’s claim that 
parents’ interest in familial intimacy can justify instilling identities and values in their children: ‘we 
certainly do not grant adults control rights to influence the values and commitments of other adults in 
the name of fostering intimacy;….if that were really what intimacy required, it would rule out the 
possibility of having a right to it (as opposed to simply desiring it) in the first place’ (176). In case it needs 
to be stated, child-centred critics of the dual interest approach do not appear to consider children’s 
interests to play a role in justifying parental efforts to instill identities and values. For instance, while 
some of them do derive parental rights from parental duties to compensate for children’s deficiencies 
vis-à-vis adults (e.g., deficiencies in intellectual abilities and life experience (Brighouse and Swift, 2014; 
Hannan and Vernon, 2008)), none to my knowledge has noted children’s deficiencies vis-à-vis sharing 
their parents’ identities and values.  
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Thus, both sides present this debate, albeit implicitly, as reflecting a dichotomous choice 
between privileging parental interests in instilling identities and values and children’s interests in 
maintaining respect for their equality and separateness. The validity of this dichotomy, however, 
depends upon obscuring the possibility that children might have vital interests of their own in their 
parents’ efforts. 
Reflection on several branches of psychological literature on acculturation and immigrant youth 
suggests that the possibility that children themselves do have strong interests in being raised to share 
their parents’ identities and values. There is much evidence to support the claim that children’s 
wellbeing (operationalized by standard measures of psychological adaptation (e.g., ‘life satisfaction, self-
esteem, and [a lack of] psychological problems’) and sociocultural adaptation (e.g., ‘school adjustment 
and behavior problems’) (Berry et al., 2006)) is enhanced by developing their ethnic identities. Since 
youth usually receive their ethnic identity from their parents, I treat the adoption of ethnic identity as a 
proxy for adopting a key aspect of their parents’ identities and, to a lesser degree, values. As shall be 
demonstrated, this literature suggests that adopting parents’ identities and values tends to promote 
wellbeing among immigrant, and in some cases, non-immigrant youth. 
A key approach in acculturation psychology involves defining acculturation strategies—identity 
options available to immigrants—and then assessing outcomes in terms of the wellbeing of those who 
adopt each strategy. In the following passage, Berry et al (2006) describe the four acculturation 
strategies they study. 
In this framework, two issues are raised: the degree to which people wish to maintain their 
heritage culture and identity; and the degree to which people wish to seek involvement with the 
larger society. When these two issues are crossed, an acculturation space is created with four 
sectors within which individuals may express how they are seeking to acculturate. Assimilation is 
the way when there is little interest in cultural maintenance combined with a preference for 
interacting with the larger society. Separation is the way when cultural maintenance is sought 
while avoiding involvement with others. Marginalisation exists when neither cultural 
maintenance nor interaction with others is sought. Integration [also called biculturalism] is 
present when both cultural maintenance and involvement with the larger society are sought 
(306). 
Applying this framework, Berry et al (2006) report three findings that support the claim that sharing 
their parents’ identities and values promotes children’s wellbeing: identification with one’s (parent’s) 
ethnic group (characteristic of the integration and separation strategies) is positively associated with 
successful psychological adaptation; identification with both the national and ethnic culture (i.e., 
integration) is associated with positive measures of psychological and sociocultural adaptation; and 
strategies that do not involve identifying with the parental/ethnic culture (i.e., assimilation and 
marginalization) are associated with much weaker levels of psychological adjustment (see also, Costigan 
et al., 2010; Liebkind, 2006; Phinney et al., 2006; Stuart et al., 2016). Explanations that have been 
offered for these correlations include the contribution of strong identities to ‘a sense of emotional 
stability and personal security’ (Sam et al., 2006: 133) and the creation of ‘ingroup loyalties and 
connectedness’ that can lead to greater levels of social support from family and others (Oppedal, 2006: 
103, 108; Costigan et al., 2010; Berry, 1997). In an interview-based qualitative study, Stuart et al (2010) 
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have also found evidence of connections between shared cultural values and families providing 
adolescents with strong support systems. 
The contribution of shared identities and values to wellbeing is also supported by psychological 
research that investigates the effects of acculturation gaps. Acculturation gaps occur where parents and 
children adapt to the host society at different rates, which can lead to greater generational differences 
in values in immigrant homes than are typically found in dominant culture homes (Phinney and Vedder, 
2006). Survey-based studies have generally found that larger acculturation gaps (i.e., where parents and 
children share less identities and values) are correlated with lower wellbeing for immigrant youth. For 
instance, Phinney and Vedder (2006) report that larger value gaps are ‘associated with poorer 
psychological and sociocultural adaptation for both immigrant and national [i.e., non-immigrant] 
adolescents’ and that adolescents who identify more strongly with the ethnic culture ‘were the least 
influenced by discrepancies’ (178, 179). While it might be assumed that these effects were due to 
parents expressing displeasure with children who chose not to share their identities and values, other 
studies suggest this may not be the case. Drawing upon an interview-based study in New Zealand, Stuart 
et al (2010) report that both immigrant parents and adolescents valued youth retaining their culture 
(119) and a study of immigrant and national mother-daughter dyads in Luxembourg found that 
‘maternal affection toward daughters seemed to be independent of value consensus’ (Albert et al., 
2013). 
Finally, the contribution of shared identities and values to children’s wellbeing also finds support 
in research that applies Phinney’s (1992) three-stage model of ethnic identity formation. The stages 
range from not having begun to explore one’s identity, to having begun, to becoming identity-achieved 
by reaching ‘a state of clarity and understanding about the meaning of their ethnicity’ (Martinez and 
Dukes, 1997: 504). In a survey-based study involving 12,386 American youth Martinez and Dukes (1997) 
found that those classified as identity-achieved reported statistically significantly higher levels of self-
esteem, purpose in life, and academic self-confidence than those with less-developed ethnic identities. 
The implication of these psychological findings is suggested by Martinez and Dukes (1997) who 
conclude that families ‘can raise adolescent wellbeing by increasing ethnic identity’ (515). On the 
assumption that children have an interest in their wellbeing, then the presumed conflict between 
parents’ and children’s interests that animates much of the debate between dual interest and child-
centred approaches, while undoubtedly real in many cases, does not appear to be nearly so prevalent as 
is often assumed. In fact, if children’s interest in increasing their psychological wellbeing is significant 
enough, it may constitute a child-centred justification for parental rights that privilege their efforts to 
instill their identities and values. 
Do parental efforts to instill identities and values undermine children’s capacity for autonomy? 
Even if children do have significant wellbeing interests in parental efforts to instill identities and values, 
it might still be argued that these interests are outweighed by the threat that such parental efforts pose 
to children’s capacity for personal autonomy. This concern draws our attention to a fundamental 
disagreement between participants in the parental authority literature regarding how to understand 
personal autonomy and what is required to promote and protect it. The discussion in this section begins 
by describing two competing conceptions of personal autonomy at play in the parental authority 
literature. It then focuses on ‘autonomy-as-choice,’ a conception that does not support state privileging 
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of these parental efforts, and assesses it in light of psychological literature on immigrant youth, 
acculturation, and identity development. The discussion concludes that concerns raised by the 
autonomy-as-choice perspective about parental efforts to instill identities and values do not find 
support in the psychological literature. 
Two conceptions of personal autonomy  
The conceptions of personal autonomy that are the focus of this section and the next have a lot in 
common. Both autonomy-as-choice and situated autonomy expect people to ground their choices in 
fairly stable values, identities, principles, etc., and to resist making choices capriciously based on random 
or arbitrary principles or momentary passions. Most important to the present discussion, they also 
agree that personal autonomy requires the values, identities, and principles upon which people ground 
their decisions to be their own. At a minimum, there are three conditions that it is generally agreed must 
be met for values to be sufficiently one’s own to support autonomy: people must not have developed 
them by being brainwashed or coerced; they must not have been rendered servile such that they always 
do what someone else tells them to do (Burtt, 2003a); and, when they formed their values, they must 
have been aware that they had alternative identities and values to choose from (Brighouse and Swift, 
2014: 164). 
Looking beyond these basic requirements, however, a key difference becomes apparent. It 
concerns the processes through which people adopt their identities and values and thus, succeed or fail 
at making them their own. What are being called autonomy-as-choice conceptions suggest that adults’ 
identities and values are only sufficiently their own where they ‘self-consciously select rather than 
accept the principles that govern their lives’ (Burtt, 2003a: 184; see also Clayton, 2012; Hannan and 
Vernon, 2008; Morgan, 2006; Reich, 2002). On this view, anything less than explicit choice constitutes 
harm because the person’s identities and values will have been determined by someone else and thus 
are not their own (Clayton, 2012). Conversely, what are being called situated autonomy conceptions 
suggest that it is possible for unchosen identities and values to become one’s own. Brighouse and Swift 
(2014) provide a good example of what this might look like when they write, 
it is not the genesis of one’s beliefs and commitments that tells us whether they are 
autonomous, but their relationship to one’s current judgment. Commitments generated by 
nonautonomous processes become autonomous when the agent reflects on them with an 
appropriate degree of [independent judgment and] critical reflection (165). 
On this view ‘independent thought and action’ are the measure of whether people’s identities and 
values are sufficiently their own, not whether they were the objects of explicit choice (Brighouse and 
Swift, 2014; Burtt, 2003a; Callan, 2002; Galston, 2002). 
Since parents typically exercise substantial influence over the conditions under which children 
develop their identities and values, this disagreement about the requirements of personal autonomy 
has implications for the question of whether states should privilege parental efforts to instill identities 
and values. Proponents of autonomy-as-choice tend to conceive such parental efforts as potential 
threats to children’s capacity for autonomy. The rest of this section reflects on these claimed threats in 
light of findings from the psychological literature on immigrant youth, acculturation, and identity 
development. Situated autonomy is considered and assessed in the next section. 
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Autonomy-as-choice 
Proponents of autonomy-as-choice are deeply concerned that parental influences on the development 
of children’s identities and values will prevent these from becoming sufficiently children’s own and, 
thus, children will not retain a capacity for autonomy as adults. Clayton (2006) illustrates this clearly 
when he writes, 
if others, such as her parents, are concerned that she is the author of her life, they will regard 
themselves as under an obligation not to choose for her, not try to get her to hold particular 
beliefs that they find attractive or compelling, or to make her engage in particular ethical 
practices, such as worship, which they regard as essential to a worthwhile life (105). 
Given this understanding of the relationship between parental influences and children’s autonomy, 
advocates of the autonomy-as-choice perspective tend to focus on two types of threats to children’s 
autonomy. These may be described as direct threats, based in parental efforts to indoctrinate their 
children, and indirect threats, derived from parents’ exercise of autonomy in their own lives. Reflection 
on psychological findings suggests that parents are neither as able to exert or to limit their influence 
over their children’s identity and value development as these threats presume and require. 
Direct threats. One autonomy-as-choice concern is that parents will directly undermine their children’s 
capacity for autonomy by attempting to indoctrinate them by sheltering them from knowledge of 
alternative identities and values (Morgan, 2006; Hannan and Vernon, 2008). The oft-cited example is 
that of the ‘fundamentalist’ religious parent who does not want her child exposed to any ideas that are 
contrary to what she teaches at home. For example, Brighouse and Swift (2014) claim that this parent ‘is 
making a mistake about the content of her duty of care. She is misidentifying the child’s true interests. 
She owes her child an upbringing that will equip him to judge for himself independently how to live his 
life’ (153). Here the concern is that the child’s ‘choice’ of identities and values will have been so 
constrained that those adopted will represent ‘adaptive preferences’ (Reich 2002) and thus will not be 
sufficiently the child’s own to support personal autonomy. To address these concerns, proponents of 
autonomy-as-choice advocate a role for the state, especially through public education, to counter 
insular parental influences and thus protect children’s capacity for autonomy. For instance, Macleod 
says schools should facilitate autonomy by exposing ‘children to different doctrines and encourag[ing] 
independent critical thinking about such matters’ (2015: 240; Reich, 2002). Clearly the threat and the 
proposed solution presume that it is normally, and not just exceptionally, possible for parents to exert 
such influence over the processes by which their children develop identities and values. 
The psychological literature on acculturation and immigrant youth suggests, however, that 
parents—fundamentalist, atheist, immigrant, or otherwise—are not nearly so able to exert control over 
the processes by which their children develop identities and values as the threats described by the 
autonomy-as-choice perspective presume. (Note: this is not to deny that this can happen, only that it is 
not so easy to orchestrate as some seem to suppose.) For instance, while Phinney writes that ‘for young 
children, whose family and community constitute their world, the customs and values in which they are 
immersed are seen as the way things are, the norm’ (2006: 119), she also suggests that most older 
children are able to access alternative identities and values from adults and peers in the community, 
neighbourhood, and school and through the media. Further, presumptions of monolithic ‘familial’ or 
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‘parental’ values must be tempered, by recognition that ‘a mother’s values do not always correspond to 
the father’s values’ (Kuczynski and Navara, 2006: 303, citing Kohn). And further, evidence is emerging to 
suggest that children and youth exercise a fair degree of autonomy over their own socialization. For 
instance, Benish-Weisman et al (2013) note that recent thinking has rejected ‘so-called fax models [of 
socialization] that assumed that parents transmitted a copy of their personal values to their children’ in 
favour of more reciprocal processes which view ‘the child as an active agent that can manipulate and 
change parents’ values’ (614); Kuczynski and Navara (2006) report that ‘the best-researched 
generalization is that children influence the course of their own socialization by influencing parental 
choice of discipline and socialization strategies’ (304); and finally, Kuczynski and Navara also note 
research that suggests that even parents who do ‘use separation strategies to preserve their cultural 
heritage may nevertheless adapt their childrearing strategies to prepare their children for success in the 
society in which they would eventually work and live their adult lives’ (317). 
Indirect threats. Besides direct attempts to indoctrinate, advocates of autonomy-as-choice also raise 
concerns about indirect threats to children’s autonomy that arise when parents exercise personal 
autonomy in their own lives. The concern is that when parents exercise autonomy by living their own 
lives according to their own identities and values, as, for example, when they attend religious services, 
this can have shaping effects on the identities and values of their children whose participation is often 
not voluntary (Clayton, 2012). Given the importance they place on conscious choice, advocates of this 
perspective believe that the effects of such parental influence must be mitigated. 
Of course, it would be much easier to accept that such influences should be mitigated if we 
could be convinced that they can be mitigated. Reasons to question parents’ ability to control the value-
shaping effects of their behaviour are found in both parental authority and psychological literatures. 
Writing in the parental authority literature Burtt (2003a suggests that ‘the circumstances of 
human development’ are such that no one really freely chooses their identities and values (200). 
Giesinger (2013) suggests that families’ forms of life are inherently so comprehensive that they will 
influence children’s values ‘even if parents refrain from intentionally educating their children’ (274). And 
Lecce suggests that parental narrowing of children’s options ‘is only problematic…if we assume, per 
impossible…that selves so produced are rendered de facto incapable of subsequently reopening’ options 
(Lecce 2008: 38). 
Turning from critics to proponents of autonomy-as-choice, uncertainty about the extent of 
parents’ ability to limit their influence is also suggested by the variety of positions proponents have 
taken with respect to what is to be mitigated and how. Regarding what needs to be mitigated Clayton 
(2012) focuses on parental intentions (353); Hannan and Vernon (2008) focus on the likely 
consequences of parental behaviour, regardless of intentions; and Morgan suggests categorically that 
‘children have an interest in being protected from value systems’ (2006: 14). A similar diversity of 
opinion is found concerning the threshold of effects on children’s value adoption that parents should 
not exceed: for Hannan and Vernon (2008) the effect of parental introduction of values should not 
control ‘future choice in irreversible ways’ (188); for Clayton (2002) it should not generate ‘avoidable 
costs with respect to goal-revision later in life’ (363); and for Morgan (2006) parental influence should 
not impede future choice by creating emotional ties to identities and values. This range variety of 
positions concerning what parents can reasonably be expected to do to mitigate their indirect influences 
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on their children indicates that proponents of autonomy-as-choice work from very different 
assumptions about what is humanly possible. 
Evidence from several fields of psychology also suggests reason to believe that much value-
shaping parental behaviour is beyond parents’ ability to consciously control. Acculturation psychology 
research suggests a variety of unavoidable parental choices that can have identity-shaping effects on 
children. Some are obvious: parents cannot help but determine the language of the home and the 
phenotype of their biological children which, in many societies, will strongly influence whether they 
have identity-shaping experiences of privilege or discrimination. Other effects are more subtle. For 
instance, by choosing where to live, parents determine the type of neighbourhood in which their 
children will grow up. This matters because it has been demonstrated that children raised in ethnically 
mixed neighbourhoods tend to display an integration/bicultural profile whereas ‘the ethnic profile 
predominates in more ethnically homogenous neighbourhoods’ (Berry et al., 2006: 324). 
Neighbourhood composition has also been shown to affect the size of acculturation gaps (Phinney and 
Vedder, 2006). 
Some findings in developmental psychology echo Giesinger’s point about the implicit influences 
of a family’s form of life. For instance, Kağitçibaşi (2012) identifies three ‘prototypical family patterns’ 
that are distinguished by their emphasis on relatedness, independence, or psychological and emotional 
interdependence. Erikson suggests that even mundane, but unavoidable, decisions like whether to 
swaddle a baby and whether to comfort a child or let her cry are ‘related to [a] culture’s general aim and 
system’ (1968: 98-99). Costigan and Su (2008) report that Chinese Canadian parents’ views on how to 
parent (e.g., authoritarian, directive, conformist) are positively correlated to the strength of their 
attachment to Chinese cultural values. And, Oppedal suggests that basic cultural values can be 
transmitted to children through ‘feeding routines, sleeping routines, and other modes of interaction’ 
(2006: 104). 
Other findings in developmental psychology provide reasons to question whether parental 
efforts to resist exerting indirect influences are likely to succeed. For instance, Erikson emphasizes the 
importance of conformity between the values parents live by and the values they seek to instill: ‘parents 
must not only have certain ways of guiding by prohibition and permission, they must also be able to 
represent to the child a deep, almost somatic conviction that there is meaning in what they are doing’ 
(1968, 103); and ‘no matter what we do in detail, the child will primarily feel what it is we live by’ (113). 
The importance of such conformity to successful value-sharing also finds support in Benish-Weisman et 
al’s (2013) empirical finding that parents whose personal values are highly differentiated from the 
values they try to inculcate ‘have been shown to convey their values less successfully to their adolescent 
children’ (617). 
Taken together, this reflection on direct and indirect threats to autonomy-as-choice suggests 
that parental efforts to exert conscious control over the processes by which their children develop 
values and over the influence of their own behaviour on those processes are less effective than the 
autonomy-as-choice perspective presumes and requires. If this is the case, then such influences may not 
be nearly as detrimental to children’s autonomy as has sometimes been supposed; it also suggests that 
efforts to restrict parental influence on children’s adoption of identities and values may be in vain. But, 
is there a conception of personal autonomy that find more support in the psychological literature. 
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Situated autonomy  
Unlike autonomy-as-choice, the situated autonomy perspective suggests that parental efforts to instill 
identities and values positively contribute to children’s personal autonomy. Consideration of 
psychological literature suggests that situated autonomy offers the advantages of congruence with how 
children’s identities and capacity for autonomy actually develop. It also suggests limitations upon 
parents’ exercise of their autonomy with which parents are more likely to be able to comply. 
According to situated autonomy, people require identities and values, including those instilled 
by parents during childhood, to become autonomous adults. A leading proponent of the conception of 
personal autonomy that I am calling situated autonomy is Sandra Burtt. She suggests an explanation of 
how children can make the identities and values they receive from their parents their own. When 
successful, Burtt suggests, such parental efforts enable children to generate what she calls ‘encumbered 
selves.’ As an encumbered self, a person identifies with (i.e., is encumbered with) inherited traditions, 
communities, and identities. ‘The idea,’ Burtt (2003b) writes, 
is to provide a child with an identity, sense of purpose, and orientation to life strong enough to 
tie him to that life and identity throughout adulthood. Education is seen as fitting the child with 
the worldview, personal commitments, and moral understandings that his parents and the faith 
community that he inhabits believe to be necessary to live a good life (179). 
Besides providing people with principles and values that can inform their agency, such identifications 
can encourage the kind of critical reflection through which children can make them their own. For 
example, Burtt (2003a) writes that teaching a child that certain ideals ‘are worthy of commitment 
because of the particular sort of person one is--born into this family, of this nationality, sharing this 
heritage, fated to this physical condition, stuck with these relatives’ promotes critical reflection and 
autonomy because 
[i]ndividuals who cultivate, accept, or adopt this sort of relationship to their ends act 
autonomously when they reason responsibly and critically about what it means to be the sort of 
person characterized by the ends they accept as given. ‘What does it mean to be a person 
who…’ is a core question of this sort of autonomous thought (187). 
Rather than promoting the ‘unquestioning’ acceptance characteristic of indoctrination, Burtt (2003a) 
suggests that such thinking promotes skills essential to ‘autonomous thought and action’ like ‘practical 
reason and the virtue of moral courage’ (189; also see Callan (2002) on the importance of autonomous 
adherence to values). Thus, Burtt writes, ‘Once we place independent thought and action rather than 
free choice at the center of our understanding of autonomy, comprehensive forms of religious and 
cultural education do not seem quite so restrictive’ (184). Recognizing that such independent thought 
and reflection may lead people to reject, replace, or modify inherited values and identifications, I think 
Callan’s (2002) description of such selves as ‘revocably encumbered’ (120) is preferable to 
‘encumbered.’ 
Situated autonomy’s claim that children must first develop secure identities before making 
identities their own finds support in the psychological literature. Identity development literatures 
suggests that distinct, yet related, processes or ‘tasks’ are involved in identity formation during 
childhood and adolescence. While the task of childhood is to learn the ‘characteristics’ (Costigan et al., 
  12 
 
2010: 264) or ‘beliefs, values and behavioral scripts’ (Oppedal, 2006: 103) of one’s ethnic and national 
cultures, as Phinney et al (2006) explain, the task of adolescence is to transform what has been learned 
into an adult identity: 
With increasing age, more mature cognitive skills support the process of constructing a sense of 
self that integrates prior understandings and experiences….For adolescents in immigrant 
families, the process of ethnic-identity formation involves examining the ethnic attitudes, 
values, and practices learned at home from their immigrant parents and considering them in 
relation to those of their peers and the larger [national] society (76; Berry 1997; Sam et al., 
2006). 
Psychological models of the processes by which people make unchosen identities and values their own 
are consistent with the role situated autonomy attributes to reflection. For instance, of successful 
adolescent identity development, Erikson (1968) writes: 
The final identity, then, as fixed at the end of adolescence, is superordinated to any single 
identification with individuals of the past: it includes all significant identifications, but it also 
alters them in order to make a unique and reasonable coherent whole of them (161). 
Further, according to Ryan and Deci’s (2000) Self-Determination Theory, people can integrate 
behaviours and values derived from constitutive connections with others (e.g., parents, groups, nations) 
into their personal identities by evaluating them and bringing them ‘into congruence with [their] other 
values and needs’ (73). 
Contrary to the autonomy-as-choice perspective, situated autonomy suggests that the greatest 
threat parents may pose to their children’s autonomy is not that they will instill values and 
identifications too strongly (although, of course, they might), but that they not do so sufficiently. For 
instance, Burtt (2003b) refers to ‘those parental abdications of responsibility that leave a child with an 
open future but no tools with which to make sense of it’ (267) and Lecce (2008) suggests that parents 
may have a duty to ‘transmit ethical, including religious, values, and practices to their children’ (39). The 
claim that children need both identity and autonomy finds support in the psychological literature in the 
context of migration to the West. According to Kağitçibaşi (2012) it is optimal for children to develop 
what she calls ‘autonomous-related’ selves which can satisfy their needs for agency and interpersonal 
relatedness. To enable parents to fulfil duties to transmit identities and values to their children, 
proponents of situated autonomy advocate for the state to extend limited parental rights, like the 
privacy and control rights associated with Schoeman in the introduction. 
The limitations on these parental rights flow logically from situated autonomy. One is that 
parents should not attempt to instill identities and values through processes that undermine their 
children’s capacity for autonomy. Thus, for instance, Burtt (2003b) rejects parental efforts to impose 
identity closure by attempting to ‘systematically wall their children off from any and all interactions with 
the outside world’ (266). This prohibits illegitimate forms of indoctrination, religious or otherwise. 
Another limitation is that children should not be encouraged to adopt values or identifications that 
would preclude them from becoming autonomous, like, for example, convincing them ‘that the best way 
of life involves unquestioning obedience and submission to the will of another person, whether priest, 
parent or politician’ (Burtt, 2003a: 188). A third limitation reflects concern for children’s wellbeing: 
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parental rights are forfeited where children are abused or neglected or where parents fail to 
demonstrate even a basic level of competence (Macleod, 2015).1 
These limitations on the exercise of parental rights offer a number of advantages. First, 
compared to the uncertainty created by limitations associated with autonomy-as-choice, it is generally 
easier to determine how they should be applied. Second, adults can respect these limitations without 
forgoing normal motivations for becoming parents like the desire to share one’s identities and values, 
passions and preferences with one’s children. Finally, these limitations are consistent with Ryan and 
Deci’s (2000) psychological findings that children’s value adoption works best when parents do not try 
impose their values on them and that identity integration is most likely to occur where people are 
introduced to behaviours and values under ‘autonomy-supportive’ as opposed to externally controlling, 
conditions (74; Kuczynski and Navara, 2006). 
It may be useful to digress from making the case for situated autonomy to explain why two 
possible limitations on parental rights have not been adopted.2 One such limitation concerns parents 
whose identities and values do not line up with those of the wider society in which they live. For 
example, while the Amish in the United States seem to raise psychologically well-adjusted children, it is 
also true that their children do not have the same access to the broad choice of life opportunities that 
mainstream American society offers other children. Should the state limit parental authority in the 
name of ensuring such children can access such wider choices? This is a difficult question and space only 
allows a brief comment here (see Robinson 2017). Where children are not being abused or neglected, or 
being raised by parents who are incompetent, I think the state should be very cautious about restricting 
parental authority for this reason. While children should be made aware that they have the right to 
exercise options in the wider community and the state should use its jurisdiction over education to 
ensure they are not completely unable to exercise such options should they so choose, the state and the 
dominant/majority community should also exercise some humility in assessing whether such children 
are being harmed by not being raised in the same way that dominant/majority community parents raise 
their children. History suggests that overzealousness to ‘save’ such children from their parents not only 
reflects a lack of humility, it may be the cause of even worse harm to the children it was meant to ‘save.’ 
Consider an example from my homeland. In 1883 Canadian Prime Minister Macdonald made the 
following remarks: 
When the school is on the reserve the child lives with its parents, who are savages; he is 
surrounded by savages, and though he may learn to read and write his habits, and training and 
mode of thought are Indian. He is simply a savage who can read and write. It has been strongly 
pressed on myself, as the head of the Department, that Indian children should be withdrawn as 
much as possible from the parental influence, and the only way to do that would be to put them 
in central training industrial schools where they will acquire the habits and modes of thought of 
white men (cited in Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015: 2).3 
For anyone who are unaware of the multigenerational harm wreaked by this effort limit parental 
authority in order to bring children’s identities and values into greater alignment with the wider society, 
please consult Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (2015). 
A second possible limitation that is not endorsed here concerns the possibility that parental 
authority may be limited because it is in the broader society’s interest that certain families and children 
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with minority identities and values be assimilated. Examples that have been suggested include families 
with terrorist, cultist, or criminal values.4 If children are well-treated within such families and not 
subjected to abuse or neglect, then, other things being equal, the state should be very hesitant about 
limiting these parents’ authority. If parents in such families are actually convicted of crimes, then social 
service agencies will be in a position to assess whether the children should be removed to foster care or 
adoption. The obvious alternative, to label such parents deviant in the absence of criminal convictions 
and to limit or deny them the right to raise their children, would be very dangerous to a free society. 
What would be the basis, in the absence of convictions, of such labelling: that they are likely to be 
terrorists because they attend a ‘radical’ mosque or they are likely to be criminals because they are 
Roma? While liberal-democratic societies should stay off this path, this does not mean they should not 
do anything at all. For instance, they could create policies to assist spouses and children to escape such 
families if they are so inclined. 
Returning to situated autonomy, the case for it is further advanced by considering how children 
are likely to adopt identities and values in the absence of intentional parental efforts to instill identities 
and values. Psychologists Ryan and Deci (2000) report that people initially adopt the values and 
behaviours that they later integrate into their identities because ‘the behaviors are prompted, modelled, 
or valued by significant others to whom they feel (or want to feel) attached or related’ (73). Thus, where 
parents resist making efforts to instill identities and values, children are likely to adopt them from other 
role models. Advocates of situated autonomy are not optimistic that the obvious alternatives, ‘peers, 
television, or the latest arbiter ‘what’s cool’’ (Burtt, 2003a: 188), are likely to inform identities that will 
promote autonomous lives. Psychologist Erik Erikson (1968) reflects a similar concern when he writes: 
If the majority of young people, therefore, can go along with their parents in a kind of fraternal  
identification, it is because they jointly leave it to technology and science to carry the burden of 
providing a self-perpetuating and self-accelerating way of life (34) 
Situated autonomy suggests at least two dangers with such sources of identities and values. One is that 
they are often not adequate, and sometimes not intended, to support autonomy. For instance, Callan 
(2002) suggests that a problem with ‘the advertising industry and mass entertainment’ as sources of 
identities and values is that their ‘persuasive strategies are designed to short-circuit independent 
thought’ (135). Another danger where identities and values are adopted from, and thus largely align 
with, popular culture is that the kinds of incongruence between personal and societal identities and 
values that can give rise to critical reflection are less likely to occur. Thus, for instance, Phinney (2006) 
reports that national (i.e., host culture) youth, whose ethnic identities tend to be affirmed by public 
education and popular culture, are the least likely to feel motivated to explore and affirm their ethnic 
identities (123; Martinez and Dukes, 1997). Conversely, identifications with the kinds of social traditions 
to which parents will often introduce their children are much more likely to generate autonomy-
supporting reflection. For instance, Besta et al (2016) report finding that where individuals’ personal 
identities are fused with social identities, like country and family, greater ‘self-concept clarity’ emerges. 
Self-concept clarity supports independent thought and action, they report, since it has been associated 
with being ‘more clear and confident when it comes to knowing who they are and what they want to do 
in life’ (61) and less willing to ‘passively follow the action of others’ (68-9). 
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The last two sections have considered whether parental efforts to instill identities and values in 
their children are likely to harm their children’s capacity for autonomy. They did so by reflecting on the 
parental authority literature in light of psychological findings. Three consecutive conclusions now appear 
justified: i) since the situated autonomy conception of personal autonomy is more persuasive than 
autonomy-as-choice, then ii) parental efforts to instill identities and values actually promote children’s 
capacity for autonomy; and, thus, iii) it is in children’s interests that states privilege and promote their 
parents’ efforts to instill identities and values. 
Conclusion 
This article has argued that liberal-democratic states should privilege parental efforts to instill their 
identities and values in their children. It has done so by considering two important critiques of such 
efforts in the parental authority literature: that such efforts overemphasize parental interests; and that 
they fail to respect children’s interests in developing a capacity for personal autonomy. Reflection on 
psychological literature concerning immigrant youth, acculturation, and identity development has 
demonstrated that these critiques do not succeed and, in fact, parental efforts to instill identities and 
values (subject, of course, to certain limitations) can significantly contribute to children’s wellbeing and 
capacity for personal autonomy. This being the case, it is in children’s interests that liberal-democratic 
states privilege such parental efforts through such measures as parental privacy and control rights. 
This conclusion has important implications. With respect to the parental authority literature, it 
suggests, contra Clayton and others, that parents should be encouraged, not discouraged, to share their 
identities and values with their children. With respect to liberal-democratic states, it suggests that they 
should adopt policies that promote and respect parental privacy and control rights. Policies that may be 
in need of review include those concerning mandatory school curricula and social cohesion (see, e.g., 
Robinson, forthcoming). Finally, with respect to the theory and practice of liberal multiculturalism, this 
articles conclusion provides the basis of a powerful response to the argument that minority cultural 
rights harm children’s interests (see, e.g., Robinson, 2017). 
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